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Annette Baier has been unsparing in her criticism of Kant’s ethical theories,
especially on the grounds that Kant has failed to provide a proper place for
human nature and sentiment in his account of morality. This place is illic-
itly occupied in Kant’s philosophy by an unfeeling reason, and more par-
ticularly by the various formulations of the categorical imperative. This
distorted view of reason’s place in our moral lives leads Kant to a flawed con-
ception of moral theory. In Postures of the Mind, Baier claims that Kantian
ethics takes the job of a moral theory to be giving “guidance in concrete
human situations, perhaps with the help of a body of professionals, heirs
to the casuists, whose job is to show how a given moral theory applies to a
case.”1 The formulations of the categorical imperative, especially the “For-
mula of the Universal Law” (FUL),2 are supposed to be the tools that Kant
hands to those heirs to the casuists. FUL then does the same job that Chris-
tian teachings did when applied by the original casuists: “The casuist who
applied Christian moral teaching to concrete, sometimes novel, human situ-
ations, were a bit like judges who, given an accepted body of statute law and
precedents, applied these to the case before them.”3
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Much attention has recently been paid to the role of judgment in Kant’s
ethics.4 The observationn that judgment has a role to play in applying the
categorical imperative allows us to avoid the error of thinking that Kant took
FUL to be a formula that can be mechanically applied, one that does not
require more judgment than applying an algorithm to a particular instance.
But this mistake is, of course, not one that Baier makes.5 The allusion to our
need for the help of the heirs to the casuists leaves no doubt that this is not
Baier’s concern. Her concern is rather that the principles might be of no
help: finding a unifying principle of morality will not necessarily enlighten
our decisions, with or without the help of judgment “sharpened by experi-
ence.”6 That is, Baier suggests that the search for ultimate principles might
be futile, and the belief that universal principles are necessary tools of moral
reasoning might be just a dogma.
The danger of futility might seem all the more serious when we note
that FUL is a formulation of a principle that, according to Kant, already
guides ordinary reason (gemeine Vernunft).7 If we are guided by it anyway,
how could its explicit formulation help us in our moral reasoning? No
doubt we can only gain by an increase in our knowledge, and our awareness
of FUL might throw light on some issues in the same way as any other
improvement in our understanding of issues related to morality. But why
should we expect that the explicit formulation of a principle that guides us
in any case could provide us with a systematic method of settling difficult
issues? 
I will begin by drawing attention to the evidence that for Kant, the main
function of the explicit formulation of the categorical imperative is not to
provide us with definite guidance in applying the categorical imperative to
particular cases. In fact, we should not expect the formulation of the cate-
gorical imperative to provide any guidance of this kind. It might happen to
give such guidance on some occasions, but we should not think of this as
the function that FUL is supposed to perform. The formulation of the cate-
gorical imperative is part of Kant’s main project of tracing the origin of
human cognitions to their proper faculties. In particular, this formulation
traces the origin of our moral judgments to the faculty of reason; it locates
what we might call “the mark of rationality” in our ethical life.8
Once these proper disclaimers on the role of the formulations of the
categorical imperative are in place, we can look at another criticism Baier lev-
els against Kant. According to Baier, Kant is a “misamorist,” that is, someone
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who distrusts “the claims of love”9—someone who takes love to be a bar-
rier to, rather than an essential part of, our moral life. Much recent literature
has tried to rescue Kant’s account of friendship from various criticisms. My
discussion here, however, will have a different focus. I want to examine a cer-
tain complaint that is not explicit in Baier’s essay “Unsafe Loves,” but which
I believe to be the ground on which the complaint of her article rests: the
allegation that Kant’s moral theory leaves no cognitive role for our senti-
ments. In defense of Kant, one might say that the moral law might toler-
ate or encourage certain feelings (or at least corrected versions of these feel-
ings), but it must treat them as blind forces that merely happen to lead us
in the right direction. No matter how much tolerance or encouragement we
allow for, we do not regain the sense that our feelings can be moral educa-
tors or instruments of moral insight. Nor do we have the sense that by inter-
acting with others, loving and being loved, we gain an insight into morality,
which could not be provided simply by internalizing a principle. The inade-
quacy of Kant’s account of friendship would thus be a consequence of the
general inadequacy of his views on the role of sentiments in moral cogni-
tion. However, once we are no longer hostage to the notion that the for-
mulation of the categorical imperative is a tool for modern casuists, we can
identify a wider cognitive role for sentiments. Experience and our natural
feelings will have an important role to play in our cognition of what the cate-
gorical imperative demands in particular cases, a role that goes beyond their
obvious functions (such as, for example, allowing us to recognize particular
cases to which the categorical imperative applies). In fact, I will argue that
Kant’s discussion of friendship is the best instance of Kant’s recognition of
this function of our affective capacities.
i
At first, nothing seems more obvious than the importance of finding a
principle of morality. Although one can be skeptical about the possibility
of finding such a principle, it is hard to object to the desirability of doing so.
Kant himself seemed somewhat irked by the fact that the importance of such
a principle was not obvious to one of his reviewers (Cf. KpV 14n). There is
no doubt that the formulation of the categorical imperative performs an im-
portant function. At the very least, FUL shows what unifies different moral
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judgments. However, few people think that this is the only function of FUL.
It seems that the categorical imperative should also have a guiding function,
in helping us achieve better judgments in particular cases. Again, at this level
of generality, it is hard to oppose such a claim. A better understanding of the
nature of morality would probably not be a hindrance, and would likely be
an aid, in developing our capacity for moral judgment. But the categorical
imperative is also thought to give the kind of systematic guidance that John
Rawls seems to take his theory to be providing; it is a theory whose major
aim is to settle our differences on moral issues:
If the scheme as a whole seems on reflection to clarify and to order our
thoughts, and if it tends to reduce disagreements and to bring divergent con-
victions more in line, then it has done all that one may reasonably ask.10
The importance of this kind of principle can hardly be underestimated.
A tool that would determine clearly what our ordinary understanding had
left obscure would, no doubt, be a desirable tool. And it is tempting to think
that a ethical theory that cannot deliver a tool of this kind is rather worth-
less. However, it is hard to believe that a principle as simple as the categori-
cal imperative could even begin to be such a tool, no matter how much
room one leaves for judgment in Kant’s ethics. Here it seems difficult not
to share Baier’s skepticism about finding such a principle, or her suspicion
that the idea that any moral guide must consist of universal and explicitly
formulated rules is a prejudice “whose self-evidence does not survive self-
consciousness.”11 In fact, once we accept that the categorical imperative
already guides the judgment of ordinary understanding, it is hard to see
how the formulation of the categorical imperative could provide any fur-
ther guidance. It is far from clear that making explicit a rule that implicitly
guides us would help us judge the particular cases falling under the rule. 
Our skepticism should increase when we look at how Kant describes the
function of the moral philosopher. By providing a formulation of the cate-
gorical imperative, the philosopher has isolated the a priori source of mo-
rality. So Kant says:
Not only are moral laws together with their principles essentially differ-
ent from every kind of practical cognition in which there is anything
empirical, but all moral philosophy rests entirely on its pure part. When
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applied to man it does not in the least borrow from acquaintance with
him (anthropology) but gives a priori laws to him as a rational being.
(G 389; emphasis mine)
Kant often admonishes fellow philosophers for trying to locate the source
of morality in empirical principles. But such confusion is widespread, and
it is what separates (true) philosophy from ordinary reason: “For philoso-
phy is distinguished from the cognition of ordinary reason in that it pres-
ents in a separate science [in abgesonderter Wissenschaft] that which the latter
conceives only confusedly” (G 390; translation amended). Given the con-
trast in this quote, I take it that Kant is using “confusedly” (vermengen) to
mean “mixed with other cognitions.”12 If this is the main confusion that be-
witches popular systems of morality, and if the avoidance of this confusion
is what sets philosophy apart from ordinary reason, then it is hard to see
how it could be the task of the philosopher to help in applying these prin-
ciples. If the philosopher has to isolate the pure source of morality, she will
search for its most abstract version, one that is not mixed with anything
empirical. Thus, since FUL abstracts from anything empirical, it is farther
removed from application to the particular conditions of human nature than
are the precepts of ordinary reason, in which the presentation of the cate-
gorical imperative is already mixed with empirical cognitions.
Take, for instance, the precept “You should show respect and gratitude
toward your parents.” Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that this
is an incontrovertible principle; ordinary reason can easily determine that
this is a valid moral precept. The philosopher knows that this is not one
of the basic principles of morality, since its truth depends on the empirical
conditions of human nature. This precept itself is quite vague, and so even
if it is incontrovertible, some of its applications might be controversial. It
might not be clear, for instance, whether refusing a request to let your par-
ents live in your house in their old age counts as a violation of this principle.
In trying to settle this issue, would a direct appeal to FUL help? It seems far
from clear that it would. More likely, it would at best show us how the prin-
ciple itself is justified rather than help with its application; that is, FUL
would probably have its application to the particular matter in hand medi-
ated by the principle “We ought to show gratitude to our parents.”
Of course, one might think that I have missed an obvious use of the
categorical imperative. A particular precept might be wrongly identified as
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having the seal of approval of morality, when in fact it does not. Respecting
one’s parents might not be something that morality demands at all. Here it
is important to note two ways in which mistakes can occur in the choice of
more basic precepts. First, despite being guided by the correct fundamental
principles of morality, we might have used bad principles of application,
wrong factual beliefs, or faulty inferences. In such cases, the formulation of
the categorical imperative could not help us. Factual beliefs and principles
of application depend on empirical principles that fall outside the scope
of the categorical imperative. Faulty inferences are certainly not a matter of
failing to be in possession of the correct moral principle.13 On the other
hand, if our specific precepts are wrong because they stem from incorrect
moral principles, then the formulation of the categorical imperative can
certainly eradicate them. I might have a mistaken conception of what the
fundamental principle (or principles) of morality is (or are); that is, I might
wish to do the morally right thing, but still be mistaken about what mo-
rality requires at the most fundamental level. However, this latter type of
mistake is not one that Kant seems to think is even possible. When we look
at the list of moral shortcomings presented by Kant in Religion Within the
Limits of Reason Alone, nothing like that shows up. In fact, this work speaks
against it. The fundamental choice of one’s character described in Religion is
between an ordering of the principles of morality and self-love, that is, be-
tween the categorical imperative and the unrestrained pursuit of one’s own
happiness,14 and there is no doubt that ordinary reason does not mistake this
principle of happiness for a fundamental moral principle.15 There is no sug-
gestion that a mistaken moral principle could be the fundamental principle
of our choices. It is important not to ascribe to Kant a concern with compet-
ing moral outlooks that he did not have. Kant rather optimistically claims
that even the bully will see the justice of his beating (KpV 61), and the mur-
derer will not complain that the death penalty is too harsh a sentence (MS
334). In fact, Kant often alludes to the ease with which ordinary reason dis-
covers what morality demands, and sometimes even proclaims its advantage
over the thought of philosophers:
And the most extraordinary thing is that ordinary understanding in
this practical case may have just as good a hope of hitting the mark as
that which any philosopher may promise himself. Indeed it is almost
more certain in this than even a philosopher is, because he can have no
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principle other than what ordinary understanding has, but he may easily
confuse his judgment by a multitude of foreign and irrelevant considera-
tions and thereby cause it to swerve from the right way. (G 404)
This should be no more surprising than the fact that we do not expect com-
plex arguments in nonformal areas to be made simpler by trying to recon-
struct their most basic premises (not just the premises we happen to agree
about), using only fundamental rules of derivation. Typically, a complex
piece of reasoning would make this task an endless and impossible one. A
complex argument usually involves a large share of accumulated wisdom;
representing this using only these meager resources would involve a great
number of steps, and would call upon a highly developed capacity to apply
the relevant concepts and principles. No doubt, appeal to basic premises or
fundamental rules of derivation can sometimes throw light on a difficult
issue, but a systematic use of the above method would be ludicrous.
It is interesting to compare Mill’s view on the principle of utility in this
context. A possible objection to the principle of utility is that its application
is not humanly possible; given the amazing complexity involved in calcu-
lating the effect of a typical action on the general happiness and the rela-
tively short span in which we have to make a decision, any attempt to be
guided by the principle of utility seems impractical. Mill’s answer to this ob-
jection is illuminating. Mill suggests that one should almost never appeal to
the principle of utility; the rules of morality we already have embody the
experience of humankind in applying the principle of utility.16 One might
claim that the principle of utility is useful in that it can be appealed to when
the rules conflict. But here, too, it would not typically work. Controversial
issues, such as legislation on hate speech, abortion, and so forth, might be
controversial precisely because the utility calculation in those cases is par-
ticularly baffling. Again, it might be true that, from time to time, appeal to
the principle of utility, as to any other account of morality, would help us see
through bias and prejudice or clarify an issue. But this is far from accept-
ing the idea that direct appeal to the principle of utility could be used as a
systematic method for settling controversial issues.17 It is important to note
that the emphasis on “calculating” here is misleading. The problem is not
that we are faced with a sum of too many addends, but rather that the prin-
ciple of utility does not tell us what counts as more or less happiness in an
individual, let alone how to compare the happiness of various individuals. 
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One may argue that the sources of confusion are multiple, and that an
explicit formulation of the principle might at least close one door. For in-
stance, a faulty inference may be best exposed with the help of the explicit
formulation of the categorical imperative. I have nothing against this claim.
There is no reason not to expect that a clearer understanding of the nature
of morality could improve our judgment in moral matters. This applies to
Kant’s work, but also to Hume’s or any other philosopher’s, insofar as he or
she puts forth a genuine contribution to the field. It is, however, a far cry
from claiming that the role of moral principle is to serve as a systematic
test to which we can appeal whenever disagreement threatens or a new case
shows up—a far cry from thinking that the main role of FUL is to serve as
the basic tool for those modern heirs of the Christian casuists. In fact, the
truth of this claim does not even make us hope that this sort of direct appeal
to FUL will even be of widespread utility in improving our judgment. Our
long experience of morality and of being implicitly guided by this principle
teaches us the application of the categorical imperative to various occasions
that depend on our knowledge of the world and of human nature. In con-
troversial issues, it should rarely be the case that direct appeal to the prin-
ciple (as opposed to the more particular lessons it has taught us through-
out centuries of moral reasoning together with experience) would settle
the issue. It is unlikely that we have missed something that could flow so
smoothly from the most abstract formulation of this principle. 
Why should we be concerned about formulating the categorical im-
perative if its use as a tool for the casuists is quite limited? Of course, this is
no place to undertake a detailed examination of Kant’s work on the cate-
gorical imperative. I will simply give an answer in broad outline. First, we
must note that FUL is arrived at by asking a specific question: “What sort
of law can that be whose presentation (Vorstellung) must determine the will
without reference to any expected effect, so that the will can be called ab-
solutely and without qualification good” (G 402)? In the Critique of Practi-
cal Reason, Kant says that the first question concerning such a critique is, “Is
pure reason sufficient of itself to determine the will, or is it only as em-
pirically conditioned that it can do so?” For Kant, these two questions are
equivalent. To say that the will is good absolutely and without qualification
is to say that the determination of its object is not empirically conditioned.
But if the determination of the will is not empirically conditioned, then the
will must be determined absolutely a priori, that is, by reason alone.18
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The formulation of the categorical imperative, therefore, allows us to
trace our moral cognitions back to their legitimate origin in the faculty
of reason (as opposed to a “chimerical idea” or a “phantom of the brain”
[G 445]). A similar project can be found in Kant’s theoretical works. There
Kant tries to show that the categories have their legitimate origin in the
understanding (they are not just “bastards of the imagination”). Formulating
a principle is, of course, only part of the project. We might need to prove its
objective reality, or its compatibility with other cognitive principles (such
as the law of universal causation). However, showing that all moral cogni-
tions are expressions of a formal principle such that, in virtue of its form,
reason must prescribe it if it prescribes anything unconditionally, is an im-
portant step. Tracing back the origin of morality to reason also traces it back
to other related concepts, such as those of freedom and self-legislation. Not
only do we locate the origin of moral cognition in reason, but by doing so,
we determine the basic properties of a will whose cognition stems from the
faculty of reason.19
These are the gains that an explicit formulation of the categorical im-
perative provides with respect to what Kant calls “the motives of specula-
tion regarding the source of practical principles” (G 390). These are not
gains to be sneered at. The explicit formulation provides the basis of our
practical self-understanding, and as such, can easily find its home among
the intellectual projects worth undertaking. Moreover, as noted above, im-
proving our self-understanding certainly cannot hurt the practical aims of
morality. However, such gains cannot, by themselves, explain Kant’s claim
that his project is also a corrective to the fact that “morals are liable to all
kinds of corruption” (G 404).
At the end of the first section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals, Kant explicitly discusses the practical advantages of a metaphysics
of morals. Philosophy is supposed to help deliver us from a “natural dialec-
tic, i.e. a propensity to quibble with these strict laws of duty, to cast doubt
upon their validity, or at least upon their purity and strictness” (G 405). It
turns out that philosophy has a practical use after all:
Ordinary reason is forced to go outside its sphere and take a step into
the field of practical philosophy . . . on practical grounds themselves. There
it tries to obtain information and clear instruction regarding the source
of its principles and the correct determination of this principle in its op-
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position to maxims based on need and inclination, so that reason may escape
from the perplexity of opposite claims. (G 405; emphases mine)
The need for a critique of our practical cognitive faculties, just as of our
theoretical ones, is the result of a dialectic in which these faculties find them-
selves entangled. In the case of practical reason, it is a practical dialectic, one
involving the claims that are made on our will. The apparent plausibility of
the claims of self-interest is what has to be combated, not any confusion
about the demands of the claims of morality. The threat concerns the fail-
ure of the principle of morality to determine our will, not uncertainty about
its contents. 
Such a project, however, commits us to the claim that our moral pro-
nouncements are instantiations of FUL; they are more particular forms of
this abstract formulation. In many cases, this is (at least according to Kant)
a rather trivial matter. Kant’s examples in the Groundwork are cases in point.
Kant chooses them not because he regards them as particularly controver-
sial, but, I think, quite the opposite: because they make it all too easy to see
(so he thinks) that a certain course of action would not conform to FUL.
At any rate, the claim that the categorical imperative is the supreme principle
of morality commits us to the claim that all our moral decisions can be seen
as instances of FUL. This commitment need not show itself in direct deri-
vations of our duties from certain principles, but it should be apparent in the
way we give and ask for moral reasons, for instance, in the way that the de-
mand for universality shows up in our reasoning. Particularists are often
keen to point out that we cannot find a nontrivial universal principle of clear
application that will be valid on all occasions. However, if FUL is supposed
to represent a commitment, rather than a decision procedure, it will be im-
mune to this sort of criticism. Even if it is true that a certain feature of an ac-
tion that seems to render it immoral according to FUL might show up in an
action that is not immoral, this would not be a fatal blow to FUL. It would
only indicate that we are committed to rethinking these situations in such
a way that only one of them is indeed compatible with acceptance of FUL.
This commitment might be demonstrated, for instance, in the fact that we
never rest content in merely saying that a moral factor that was relevant in
one case is simply not relevant in another. If I think that breaking a promise
makes an action immoral in one case, but I allow that breaking a promise in
a different circumstance is not immoral, I do not think that my duties of
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justification can be fulfilled merely by saying “that an action is an instance of
breaking a promise is sometimes morally relevant, but not always.” Rather,
I am committed to finding a relevant difference. In Kant’s terminology, I try
to conceive of the two actions as governed by different maxims.
This point can be made more clear if we think about a longstanding
objection against Kant. It has been a challenge to the ingenuity of philoso-
phers to try to find counterexamples to FUL. A standard source of counter-
examples is the possibility of generating coordination problems by univer-
salizing perfectly innocent maxims. For instance, if I like to do my shopping
when no one else is doing theirs, in order to avoid the hassle of long lines,
I might find to my shock and surprise that I have been violating a perfect
duty. Suppose my maxim is this: “In order to avoid lines when I shop, I shall
shop only at a time when no one else is shopping.” Assuming a certain scar-
city of available store hours, we could not conceive, it seems, that everyone
would be able to act from this maxim. 
However, it is easy to tinker with maxims to avoid those embarrassing
conclusions. For instance, there is no problem with this maxim: “Before
entering every shop I shall take a peek inside, and if I find that there is some-
one inside, I shall turn around and go; otherwise, I’ll shop.” The problem
with this solution is that it seems as if we are tinkering with the maxims to
make the action permissible. With enough tinkering, any action might turn
out to be permissible.20 However, this “objection against tinkering” makes
sense only if we think of FUL as primarily a deliberative tool. Under the in-
terpretation I have been advancing here, this “tinkering” can be seen as the
working out of our commitment to have our moral practice bear the mark
of rationality. Insofar as ordinary reason can figure out on its own the de-
mands of morality, reconceiving these demands in terms of maxims that
conform to the formulations of the categorical imperative is not mere tin-
kering with maxims, but a presentation of its insight in a form that makes it
clear that this insight has a rational source. Of course, this is not to say that
ordinary reason is infallible in this regard. And difficulties in reconceiv-
ing one’s moral commitments in this way might signal a problem with these
commitments. But this is only one source of evidence that something has
gone awry with our moral judgments; discovering that they are often self-
serving, that they are connected to prejudice or anger, or that they are in
conflict with the judgment of other reasonable people may be symptoms of
the same problem. Once again, there is no guarantee that those difficulties
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of regimenting our moral insight in accordance with FUL will be a particu-
larly important means of correcting our mistakes in judgment.
i i
Kant has often been chastised for not providing a proper place for human
nature and sentiment in his account of morality. Certain features of his
moral theory appear to lend support to this charge: Kant argues that our un-
derstanding of morality is exhausted by our knowledge of a principle of pure
reason, that is, the categorical imperative. Kant, no doubt, would claim that
no account of morality based on empirical incentives could provide us with
a genuine principle of practical reason, and he often emphasizes the purely
rational source of the moral law. Moreover, he repeatedly asserts that it is the
wish of all rational beings to see themselves rid of their inclinations, and thus
of all forms of nonrational motivation.21
Other aspects of Kant’s work suggest a more sympathetic role for the
sentiments in our moral life. In his famous response to a criticism raised
by Schiller, Kant makes it clear that sentiment and morality cannot com-
pletely diverge:
If one asks what is the aesthetic22 character, the temperament, so to
speak, of virtue, whether courageous, hence joyous, or fear-ridden and
dejected, an answer is hardly necessary. This latter slavish frame of
mind can never occur without a hidden hatred of the law. And a heart
which is happy in the performance of its duty (not merely complacent
in the recognition thereof ) is a mark of genuineness in the virtuous
disposition.23
I will argue in the following sections that Kant’s views do accord a
proper role to the interaction between reason and sentiments in our un-
derstanding of morality, and in the attainment of moral insight. This pos-
sibility, I believe, has been made plausible by the arguments from the pre-
vious section. If we think that direct application of the categorical imperative
is not the main tool of actual moral deliberation, then we might conclude
that there is a role for sentiments here. Indeed, in light of the arguments
of the previous section, we might think that we ought to find a role for our
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sentiments here, for pure reason offers nothing other than the most abstract
formulation of the categorical imperative. 
Kant certainly takes the categorical imperative to be the sole principle
of morality, and this principle of morality is, so to speak, a product of un-
aided reason. Yet, contrary to appearances, Kant’s commitment to these
claims does not prevent him from providing for a cognitive role for senti-
ments in our moral life. This cognitive role is worked out most clearly in
Kant’s account of friendship, and in particular, his views on the relationship
between friendship and the categorical imperative. By examining this rela-
tionship, I aim to show how sentiments and the abstract moral law combine
to shape crucial aspects of our conception of the good in Kant’s moral phi-
losophy. In particular, I will try to demonstrate that our affective feelings
toward our friends provide us with subordinate maxims, maxims that guide
us in applying the categorical imperative, and so have a positive role to play
in specifying what counts as a moral life. At the end of this section, I hope
to have shown that Baier’s insights are compatible not only with Kant’s ac-
count of friendship, but also with the thought that Kant has correctly un-
derstood the cognitive role of sentiments and their relation to the rational
principle of morality.
One might think that Kant’s moral theory is incompatible with the
ideals of friendship and, in general, incapable of dealing with human rela-
tions, because of its demands for impartiality.24 According to some of these
criticisms, Kant’s claim that friendship constitutes what he calls a “moral
ideal” must, at least, be contrary to the spirit of the rest of the enterprise.25
Such criticisms have been addressed elsewhere, so I will not try to offer an
explicit answer to them here. Many of these responses have also been rather
successful in explaining how, for Kant, sentiments are not merely obstacles
and hindrances to the moral law. 26 As I indicated above, my concern is more
specific: I want to investigate whether Kant can allow for a proper cogni-
tive role for our sentiments. These investigations will also address some of
Baier’s objections to Kant’s account of friendship—objections that are not
answered in the literature. 
Kant speaks of true friendship as an ideal set for us by reason. And,
according to Kant, we have a duty of friendship, a duty to adopt this ideal
(MS 469). Thus, perfect friendship must conform to rational norms, and
is, in a sense, the highest expression of these rational norms, as we will see in
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a moment. But how do we come to know that we have such a duty, and what
kind of duty is that of friendship? What is the relation between the duty of
friendship and the natural friendly feelings whose onset seems to predate
our awareness of a duty of friendship?
One answer that we might be tempted to give to this last question is
“none.” Kant carefully distinguishes between different kinds of friendship,
and disdains the kinds of friendship that he attributes to the “rabble” (Cf.
MS 471). The friendship that it is a duty to strive for must, one might say,
be derived from the moral law and thus from pure practical reason. But if
this is so, it might seem that how we feel toward certain people is irrelevant
both to our understanding of friendship as a duty and to the cultivation of a
friendship according to duty.27 If this were a consequence of Kant’s account
of friendship, it would certainly fail to provide us with an example of how
our sentiments can contribute to our understanding of morality (or to our
moral agency). Some of Kant’s texts might seem to support this reading.
Kant says that friendship as an ideal “is not derived from experience”( VE
217 [202]), and that “friendship cannot be an affect, for affect is blind in its
choice, and after a while it goes up in smoke” (MS 471).
It is true that Kant says that friendship, at least the perfect friendship
that it is our duty to strive for, is not derived from experience. Friendship is
an “idea,” and this means for Kant that it is a standard against which we can
judge empirical objects.28 But experience could not provide the standard it-
self, nor the grounds for accepting this standard as a proper way of evaluat-
ing actual friendships. Experience could only tell us how certain friends ac-
tually behave, or how people actually behave, but not that they ought to have
friends, nor how they ought to behave toward their friends.
However, accepting this claim does not imply that experience cannot
contribute to the formation of this idea, and in particular it does not imply
that we cannot see the contribution of human sensibility in the formation
of this idea. It might be the case that unaided reason is the ground of the
idea of friendship; however, reason cannot, by itself, specify its full content.
We can get a better sense of how Kant could accept the idea that the duty of
friendship cannot be fully known by merely contemplating the moral law,
and at the same time hold that the idea of friendship is not derived from
experience, if we look at the following passage from the introduction to the
Metaphysics of Morals:
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a metaphysics of morals cannot dispense with principles of application,
and we shall often have to take as our object the particular nature of
man, which is known only by experience, in order to show in it what
can be inferred from universal moral principles. But this will in no way
detract from the purity of these principles or cast doubt on their a priori
source. This is to say, in effect, that a metaphysics of morals cannot be
based upon anthropology but can still be applied to it. (MS 216–17)
Of course, to say that we might need to rely on empirical knowledge to
apply the moral law is very far from accepting the idea that our sentiments
make any serious contribution to our understanding of the moral law. In
order to apply modus ponens to the empirical world, we need to know what
kinds of conditionals and conditions are true, and this knowledge is certainly
empirical knowledge. But it is a formidable leap to infer from this trivial
point that our empirical knowledge contributes in any way to our under-
standing of logic. The last sentence of this quotation might suggest that
Kant does not wish to concede anything beyond a similar, trivial point with
respect to the relation between empirical knowledge and our understand-
ing of the moral law. 
However, even though it is true that the contribution of principles other
than those of pure reason in the realm of morality can only be as principles
of application, we are not thereby committed to belittling their role in
our understanding of morality in general, and our duty of friendship in
particular. The very mention of “principles of application” suggests that
applying the moral law is not as straightforward a matter as applying a rule
like modus ponens. If the conditions of application of the moral law were
obvious, and if they amounted to merely replacing some variables with
the appropriate information, we would have no more need of principles of
application in the case of the moral law than we have in the case of modus
ponens.
By looking at one of Kant’s own examples of lack of judgment, we can
clearly see that the role of sentiments goes beyond merely providing us
with material for application of the FUL, and that they play a truly cogni-
tive role in the realm of morality:
A physician . . . may have at command many excellent pathological . . .
rules, even to the degree that he may become a profound teacher of
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them, and yet, none the less, may easily stumble in their application.
For . . . he may be wanting in natural power of judgment. (KrV, B173)
Imagine a school of medicine in which, during the first years, students
learned only from books, with no practical training, the latter being left to
the last two years of teaching. A student who left before the two years of
practical training would certainly not be a very good doctor. His short-
comings would be “due to his not having received . . . adequate training for
this particular act of judgment” (KrV, B173).
Because medicine is a practical science, we would consider someone’s
knowledge of medicine deficient if his knowledge of biological theory were
unimpeachable, but if he did not know that being unwilling to run a mara-
thon did not count as being in a lethargic state. However, we should not be
misled by this example to downplay the contribution of “judgment sharp-
ened by experience.” Medical textbooks do not try to separate the contribu-
tion of each faculty, let alone isolate the work of pure reason. Thus, many
of the rules contained in those books are already rules of application based
on judgment; that is, they are rules generated when the faculty of judgments
tries to apply more general rules to cases in which the application of the rule
is not obvious. Kant explicitly states that judgment performs such a role in
morality by providing us with subordinate maxims: “Ethics inevitably . . .
leads to questions that call upon judgment to decide how a maxim is to be
applied in particular cases, and indeed in such a way that judgment provides
another (subordinate) maxim” (MS 411).
It is also helpful to remember that we can form no determinate idea of
how perfectly rational beings would follow the moral law. It is not clear, for
instance, how the rule against suicide (or self-termination) would apply to
them. There is no “system of nature” that would collapse on the assump-
tion that self-termination is premissible. The same holds for beneficence; it
is a form of inconsistent willing for us not be beneficent, but this does not
seem to apply for beings without needs, even if they have the power to help
finitely rational beings like us. A similar point can be made for finitely ra-
tional beings whose inclinations are radically different from ours, but who
are also subject to the moral law. Since we can assume that they have needs,
we can also assume that some kind of maxim of beneficence binds them;
but since we know nothing about the nature of their needs, we have no de-
terminate idea of what such a maxim would prescribe.
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Thus, if pure reason provides only a very abstract principle, the contri-
bution of our sensible nature can be at least partly constitutive of our un-
derstanding of the duty of friendship. If applying the moral law requires
making difficult judgments, then the fact that our sentiments could make a
genuine contribution only to the application of the moral law does not in
any way threaten the cognitive role these sentiments play in the formation of
our understanding of what counts as a life guided by the categorical impera-
tive. An agent might require more than abstract knowledge of these rules
to know what would count as a life lived according to these rules in particu-
lar circumstances, or even to know what counts, for a particular kind of ra-
tional being (such as a rational being with human sensibilities), as follow-
ing these rules. For those rules whose application is not a matter of course,
principles of application provide guidance that is not straightforwardly con-
tained in the more abstract rule.29
At least with respect to the duties of virtue, there is no doubt that, for
Kant, the application of the highly abstract categorical imperative is no ob-
vious matter and requires the exercise of judgment. As noted above, judg-
ment provides subordinate maxims that serve as principles of application of
the moral law. The moral law enjoins us, for instance, to make the ends of
other human beings our own. However, an understanding of the moral law
is not enough to explain how we should go about adopting other people’s
ends. It is a fairly straightforward consequence of, for instance, the ideal of
the kingdom of ends that we make the happiness of others our end.30 The
idea of a kingdom of ends enjoins each rational being to think of every other
rational being as a legislator in the kingdom of ends, and thus to make their
ends his own.31 But there is no obvious way to apply this injunction to par-
ticular actions. Every selfish action could be seen as pursuing my ends only
on this occasion, as opposed to disregarding the ends of others.32 Thus, in and
of itself, no action I undertake—at least as long as it does not conflict with
any other duty—is obviously incompatible with my having adopted the gen-
eral maxim of beneficence. Disregarding the ends of others on this particular
occasion could always be the result of an overriding need of my own, rather
than a failure to make someone else’s end my own.
Given the complexity of adjudicating the demands of my needs and
those of others, I need subordinate maxims that will help me identify the
proper demands of the duty of beneficence. I cannot evaluate the proper
place of these claims without good exercise of judgment about human na-
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ture, and about the importance of different needs for different persons. The
moral law cannot provide us with an understanding of the place of the dif-
ferent elements in the conception of the good of different human beings,
nor can it help us adjudicate their different claims. Yet, without this under-
standing, we cannot have subordinate maxims with any content. In particu-
lar, I need to know when the satisfaction of my needs should be foregone,
in order to satisfy the needs of others, given the conditions of human na-
ture. As we can see from this case, principles of applications are those prin-
ciples that will help us determine what counts as a life guided by the cate-
gorical imperative for rational beings who are also human beings.33
Among the conditions of human nature is the fact that we are not per-
fectly virtuous, and thus, to use Kant’s form of expression, that which I give
might not be returned to me. Our friendly feelings and our capacity to cul-
tivate friendships provide us with an understanding of a certain possibility
of human nature—that is, that I take a natural interest in the ends of my
friend. In loving someone, I already find myself making someone else’s end
my own. The idea of the kingdom of ends permits us to see how this form
of human sensibility can be developed to form a moral ideal, one according
to which our subjective needs are taken to be objective ends. Consequently,
on the ideal of friendship, the needs of my friend ought to make the same
demands on my will as do my own. This ideal prescribes that we form per-
fect friendships, friendships in which the love of a friend for another is lim-
ited only by the requirement of mutual respect. This is an ideal of human na-
ture. Friendship might not be an available option for other rational beings;
they might recognize moral ideals that are unintelligible to us in view of
our human nature. They might have other ways of sharing ends or manag-
ing to live in accordance to the principle of beneficence that depend on quite
different natures. So, the moral ideal of friendship is not accessible by pure
reason alone, but requires that our affective capacities reveal to us a particu-
lar form of making the ends of others our own.
Friendship, for Kant, requires the interaction of love and respect. This
interplay of love and respect is an important example of how sentiments and
reflection guided by the moral law cooperate in the specification of what
counts as a life lived according to the maxim of beneficence, and thus ac-
cording to the categorical imperative. We naturally feel affection toward cer-
tain people; these feelings are possible only because we have some natural
inclinations or some natural dispositions to form such inclinations. Our
Friendship and the Law of Reason ! 267
Jenkins-13  1/11/05  11:23 AM  Page 267
inclinations, however, can be shaped by habit and thus by the exercise of rea-
son. For instance, Kant argues that a person who is beneficent from duty
will end up loving the recipients of her beneficence. Kant interprets the bib-
lical command “Love your neighbor as yourself ” as follows:
[It] does not mean that you ought immediately (first) to love him and
(afterwards) by means of this love do good to him. It means, rather, do
good to your fellow, and your benevolence will produce love of man in
you (as an aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general).34
In the same way, we have “an indirect duty to cultivate the compassionate
natural (aesthetic) feelings in us.” However rational activity can help shape
our aptitude for love, this aptitude is nonetheless part of human sensibility.
Of course, it is not necessarily the case that love is the result of our virtuous
willing. Love can be “pathologically” determined—that is, determined by
the contingent, nonrational aspects of our faculty of desire. We may love
someone who was never the object of our virtuous willing. Moreover, even
the extent of our love for our fellows is largely determined by various aspects
of human nature—Kant claims, for instance, that “it is not man’s way to
embrace the whole world in his good will” ( VE 222 [206]).
Respect, on the other hand, has no pathological manifestation. Respect
can be effected only by the moral law (cf. KpV 76–78). Kant equates respect
with consciousness of the “immediate determination of the will by the law”
(G 401n), or with “morality itself, regarded subjectively as a drive” (KpV
76). So, we can think of respect as our awareness of the moral law insofar as
it can determine us to act. It might seem strange that we talk about respect
for a friend, since, as we would expect from the above definitions of respect,
and as Kant himself emphasizes, the only proper object of respect is the
moral law (G 401n and KpV 76).
However, a person can be at least indirectly the object of respect inso-
far as the moral law resides in that personor, in other words, insofar as she is
a rational agent. Respect for others can be thus understood as “the maxim
of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person”
(MS 449). To show respect for a particular person is to have one’s self-
esteem limited in this way, and thus we can say that reason must shape our
friendly feelings and our inclinations arising out of friendship so that friend-
ship does not demand a suspension of morality. In other words, the work
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of reason over sentiments has to make sure (at least in the ideal case) that our
friendly feelings will not be the source of commitments that compete with
the moral law. Rather, they must turn out to be the source of projects and
commitments that express the moral law.
Respect and love make different contributions to the moral ideal of
friendship. The feeling of respect in a friendship is the direct product of the
activity of reason, of the understanding of the moral law. Respect is the
expression of the moral law in our sensible nature, and Kant equates it
with our consciousness of our duty (MS 464). On the other hand, our af-
fectionate feelings toward our friends owe much more to our natural incli-
nations. Although they are capable of being corrected and encouraged by
our consciousness of the moral law, they cannot be wholly grounded in this
consciousness.
The duty of friendship can thus be seen as a specification of the maxim
of beneficence, made possible through the cooperation of some sensible as-
pects of human nature. The categorical imperative could not prescribe such
a duty, if it were not for our natural capacity to engage in the kind of sen-
sible relations with other people that make us take the kind of interest that
we take in the welfare of our friends. Although the duty of friendship can-
not be arrived at by a straightforward application of FUL, the categorical
imperative guides us in singling out our friendly feelings as setting morally
worthy ends, and provides us with a framework for the proper cultivation
of such feelings. That is to say, insofar as we think that a particular ideal of
friendship is an expression of a moral ideal, we are committed to the possi-
bility of accounting for it as an instantiation of the principle of beneficence.
And accounting for this ideal is not to account for some raw, indiscriminate
feeling, but rather for our sensibilities developed under the guidance of our
rational nature. If Kant is right, then, our friendly feelings, when properly
corrected by reflection, provide us with determinate ends that constitute
our conception of what could count as living a life guided by the categori-
cal imperative.
i i i
It might be worth looking into some objections to this account of the role of
sentiments in Kant’s account of friendship. One might object that even if
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Kant allows for such a role, his commitment to the overriding character
of morality will prevent him from seeing that our sentiments, especially in
the case of friendship, can be better guides than the moral law. Some might
argue that friendship is a form of human relationship that does not need
to be patrolled by the strict rules of morality. 35 It is immoral to use other
people’s rightful property as if it were my own, but friends would not (or
should not always) feel harmed if their friends violate this requirementmy
friend will not be offended if I use his car, without his express consent, to
pick up my sister stranded in a bad neighborhood. Finally, if it is true that
friendship involves relaxing the claims of morality, there would no way that
Kant could count friendship as any kind of practical ideal. For Kant, noth-
ing can legitimately relax the strict claims of morality.
However, we should not be misled by the demand that the rules of mo-
rality be “strict.” Suppose I want to send an open letter to a paper that will
denounce someone, but since I am afraid of his revenge, I do not want to
sign my name. I know that the paper will not publish an anonymous letter,
so I decide to sign someone else’s name. This is indeed a shameful thing
to do. It would certainly not make it any better if the name I sign was my
friend’s; if anything, this would make it worse. I cannot say “Moral rules
are not so strict among friends, so it is not so bad to exploit my friend,” or
even, “at least it is better than exploiting a stranger.” To say that the rules of
morality are strict is to say that nothing can cancel their overriding char-
acter, including friendship, and this seems to be confirmed by the example
above.36 But, what I can expect of an intimate friend might be relevant in
determining what I can or ought to do or refrain from doing. Indeed, there
might be nothing wrong about using my friend’s car without her manifest
consent in circumstances in which I would not use a stranger’s car without
asking permission. In certain contexts, the fact that someone is my friend
would require, to use this imprecise manner of speaking, that I follow the
rules of morality more strictly. Suppose I am informed of a poorly advertised
but desirable job opening for which I am reasonably qualified. I might know
of another person who is more qualified for the job, a person whom I have
never met and to whom I am in no way related, and who, I suspect, might
not be aware of this opening. At least in certain circumstances, it would not
be a violation of my duty not to inform this person of this job. However, in
the same circumstances, it would be a serious moral failing not to inform this
person of this job opening if this person happened to be one’s best friend. 
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An observation that Kant makes in another context seems to apply here
as well. Kant claims that Aristotle mistakes the difference between the miser
and the spendthrift person. The difference is not that the latter does the
same thing as the former does, but to a lesser degree. The difference must be
in their maxims (MS 404). Here too, the difference between how one treats
one’s friends and how one treats strangers is best accounted for by the fact
that these different actions fall under different maxims, not by the need to
be more or less bound by the restraints of morality. In fact, Kant seems to
be in a particularly good position to explain why we might be tempted by
this improper way of speaking to claim that in the first case, the moral rules
seem to be “looser” for our friends, and in the second case, “stricter.” The
ideal of friendship is an ideal of taking my friend’s end as my own, of al-
ways sharing each other’s ends. Although real friendships fall short of this
ideal, I know that I can expect that my friend will share my end when I need
to rescue my stranded sister, in a way that I cannot expect from a stranger.
And it may be consistent with thinking of a stranger as a fellow human that
I do not inform her of job opportunities I covet. I may be allowed to give my
interests significantly more weight than those of a stranger’s without vio-
lating the principle of beneficence. But I could not be guided by the ideal
of friendship if I let my interests weigh so much more heavily against my
friend’s in such a case. 
A more serious threat implicit in this objection is that Kant’s account
of friendship might turn out to be too “intellectualist”: since it gives such
an important role to reflection and the limiting conditions of the moral
law, it cannot account for the more affectionate, humane forms of friend-
ship which are truly valuable. If this turns out to be the case, despite our
attempts to identify the contribution of sentiments, it would certainly lend
credence to the suspicion that Kant’s ethics cannot accommodate in any
plausible way the role that sentiments play in our moral lives. Indeed, Kant
often describes the role of respect in a way that cannot but foment such sus-
picions and might seem quite repugnant. The following is a prime example:
“Love can be regarded as an attraction and respect as a repulsion, and if the
principle of love bids friends to draw closer, the principle of respect requires
them to stay at proper distance of each other” (MS 470). It seems plausible
to object that friendship does not require a principle that keeps friends at a
proper distance; this is a principle that leads people away from friendship
into cold indifference. 
Friendship and the Law of Reason ! 271
Jenkins-13  1/11/05  11:23 AM  Page 271
The requirement for respect and lack of excessive familiarity might
bring to mind the picture of a friend who refuses to forgo a whole array of
formalities—someone, for example, who will not come to visit her friend if
her shirt is not properly ironed. The above discussion of Kant’s notion of
respect should have made it clear, however, that this cannot be what Kant
means. The distance that respect establishes cannot be different from the
distance that the moral law requires. To say that respect imposes a certain
“distance” between friends amounts to no more than to say that friends re-
main two different persons with autonomous wills. This is, in itself, a quite
plausible claim, even if one wants to take issue with the way in which Kant
marks this distanceor with the particular restrictions that Kant thinks the
moral law imposes on friendships.
If, on the one hand, some inclinations can be shaped by reflection to
conform to the moral law and be part of a moral ideal, then these same in-
clinations, abstracted away from reflection, might carry with them some
temptations to deviate from the moral law. Reflection teaches us that friend-
ship as an ideal would involve a greater amount of mutual love than we en-
counter in the world, but also that not everything that is done out of love
can meet with our approval.
In particular, love might tempt us to erase the boundaries between per-
sons and to disregard the autonomy of each will. Indeed, this temptation is
a natural outgrowth of these same aspects of love that make love part of a
moral ideal. The more I care about my friend, the more I see her happiness
as playing a role in my life similar to the role of my own happiness. Those
who love each other come to a (partial) union, and this union is partly con-
stitutive of the ideal of friendship. The idea of friendship, Kant says, is one
“in which self-love is superseded by a generous reciprocal love” ( VE 217
[201]). However, I would violate the demand of respect for my friend if I
not only adopted her ends, but also took myself to be capable of setting her
ends. No matter how much I care for her well-being, it is the exercise of her
judgment that determines her ends; we remain two different agents with
two different bodies and differently constituted conceptions of the good.
Thus, the boundary between persons must remain in place if I am still to
regard my friend as an agent—if my actions are to be compatible with rec-
ognizing her exercise of judgment as constituting her good. The duty of
respect is, for Kant, the recognition of another as a person, or as an agent:
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“The duty of respect . . . is contained in the maxim not to degrade any other
man to a mere means to my ends” (MS 450; cf. MS 462). I cannot commit
my friend to political causes, no matter how noble they are; I cannot use her
body as if it were just a continuation of mine; and I cannot determine for her
what her happiness consists in, no matter how well-intentioned I am. Given
that the principle of respect is what makes us treat our friends as agents, its
claims will be limiting conditions of the claims of love. The principle of love
draws friends closer by making a friend’s end one’s own, but the principle of
respect keeps us at a proper distance by reminding us that we can make our
own only those ends that our friends have already recognized as their ends.
The limits imposed by respect allow us to see the ideal of friendship as a
moral ideal, and the maxims of my actions that have their source in a con-
ception of friendship as ones prescribed by the moral law. 
One may have suspicions that some of Kant’s text does not fit the ac-
count given here very well. Kant’s discussion of friendship often seems to
suggest that, at least in this case, our sentiments have no such role; indeed,
it seems to suggest that the ideal of friendship is an ideal formed indepen-
dently of these sentiments. One passage quoted earlier may seem to be es-
pecially difficult to reconcile with attributing any positive role to our friendly
feelings in the formation of any moral ideal: “friendship cannot be an af-
fect, for affect is blind in its choice, and after a while it goes up in smoke”
(MS 471). 
However, when we look at what Kant means by “affect,” we see that this
passage is compatible with my interpretation, and perhaps lends further sup-
port to it. According to Kant:
Affects belong to feeling insofar as, preceding reflection, it makes this im-
possible or more difficult. Hence an affect is called precipitate or rash and
reason says . . . that one should get hold of oneself. (MS 407) 37
Friendship based on affect is thus exactly the kind of friendship that does
not or cannot heed the principles that we set ourselves upon reflection. It is
a kind of infatuation that is blind in its choice, because it makes reflection im-
possible. In fact, exactly because of this incompatibility with reflection, no
kind of affect will last for long; it will be a mere impulse, whose claim will
go away as soon as we take hold of ourselves again.
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We can now turn to some of Baier’s objections to Kant’s account of friend-
ship. Baier claims that Kant does not regard friendship as having intrinsic
value, but only as being an instrument, “and a risky one,” whose purpose is
to correct judgment. 38 Certainly, some of what Kant says seems to commit
him to this view:
To have a friend whom we know to be frank and loving, neither false nor
spiteful, is to have one who will help us to correct our judgment when it
is mistaken. This is the whole end of man, through which he can enjoy
his existence. ( VE 222 [206]; emphasis mine)
However, we should not be confused here by what Kant means by the
“whole end of man.” Correct judgment cannot but be the whole end of man,
since it amounts to attaining the right view, both in the theoretical and the
practical realm. It is doing right and thinking right. But this does not rule
out the fact that part of what we judge is that we should care about our friends
for their own sake. To say that we always aim at judging right does not rule
out the possibility that to care for our friends for their own sake is to judge
rightly. The following remark of Kant, however, is considerably harder to
integrate in an attractive picture of friendship: “It is very unwise to place
ourselves in a friend’s hand completely, to tell him all the secrets which might
detract from our welfare if he became our enemy and spread them abroad”
( VE 224 [208]).
Baier points out that we cannot praise friendship and at the same time
enjoin people to avoid the risks of trusting others: “if all the world (except
the misamorist philosophers) is to keep loving lovers, it will have to come
to accept risks too.”39 We can begin to rescue Kant by noting that the idea
that we should not entrust our friends with our secrets in light of certain
prudential considerations is incompatible with what he says in the Meta-
physics of Morals. There, he argues that human beings have a “need to reveal
themselves to others” (MS 471), and that this need can only be realized
through moral friendship, which Kant defines as the “complete confidence
of two persons in revealing their secret feelings and judgments to each
other” (MS 472; emphasis mine). The text leaves little room to doubt that
Kant thinks that we ought to pursue such friendships. More interestingly,
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this kind of friendship is not considered by Kant to be a mere ideal, “but
( like black swans) actually exists here and there in its perfection” (MS 472).
It is important to avoid leaving the impression that Kant simply changed his
mind between the Lectures on Ethics and the Metaphysics of Morals. In the Lec-
ture on Ethics, he says: “Each of us needs a friend, one in whom we can con-
fide unreservedly, to whom we can disclose completely all our dispositions and
judgments, to whom we can communicate our whole self [dem er sich völ-
lig kommunizieren kann].”40
This apparent inconsistency might justify certain textual gymnastics.
We might say that Kant is not warning us against trusting a friend in gen-
eral, but rather warning us that we should not trust a friend whom we would
have reason to believe would betray our trust. The passage immediately fol-
lowing the one that warns us against telling all our secrets lends some cre-
dence to this reading: “In particular, we ought to place no weapon in the
hands of a hot-headed friend who might be capable of sending us to the gal-
lows in a moment of passion” ( VE 224 [208]). It seems reasonable enough
that Kant will warn his students against making themselves the victims of the
outbursts of such a friend. No doubt one wonders, in such cases, whether it
is not the best advice to avoid friendship with this kind of person altogether.
However, there is nothing wrong with Kant’s warning, and it should not be
confused with an injunction against seeking friends in whom we can con-
fide fully.41
The natural inclinations of love that express themselves in friendship
allow us, under the scrutiny of reason, to think of an ideal realization of the
maxim of beneficence, in which we make the ends of our friends our own.
In friendship, we are fellow legislators in the kingdom of ends. Kant says
that in friendship, all that I give I receive back ( VE 207 [201]). In fact, what
I get back is more than what I could possibly have by myself. For, in friend-
ship, self-love, freedom, and sympathy all find their highest expression. 
It might now seem that we have gone too far in attempting to make
room for a positive role for sentiments in Kant’s moral philosophy. If our
inclinations have such an important role to play, why should we say that a
rational being wishes to get rid of his or her inclinations? However, rec-
ognizing that our sentiments have a positive role in our moral life is com-
patible with recognizing that they can also turn out to be hindrances. Em-
pirical motives do not necessarily coincide with the ends of morality. A wish
to be rid of our inclinations should be understood as no more than a wish
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not to be tempted to act immorally. This wish can only be what we could
call an “aspectual wish”; that is, we can only wish to get rid of our inclina-
tions insofar as they are threats to the commands of the moral law. However,
we cannot unqualifiedly desire or make this wish the end of our actions. In
fact, Kant himself warns against this temptation: “Considered in themselves
natural inclinations are good, i.e., not reprehensible, and to want to extirpate
them would not only be futile but harmful and blameworthy as well” (R 58).
Our sentiments can and often do lead us away from the path of virtue.
For Kant, it is this recognition—not the fact that the philosopher is in a
particularly good position to settle moral disputes—that underscores the
practical significance of the philosopher’s task of tracing the source of our
moral cognitions to the faculty of reason. As Kant engages in this task, it
is natural that the positive role of sentiments will be left aside. However,
this should not make us lose sight of Kant’s keen awareness of the extent to
which human finitude requires reliance upon our sensible nature. 
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